The rise of tribalism in the United States has intensified the rancor between the left and the right to levels not seen since the Civil War. The antagonism between the two adversaries is showing up in the demographics as we reshape our politics. Red and blue state migrations get a lot of airtime, but what’s actually happening is more complex because Americans behave as humans, not as robotic political participants.
There is no question that, over the last 25 years, red states have become redder and blue states have become bluer. There are fewer swing states today, as we saw in the 2024 election, when Michigan, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, and Wisconsin were the keys to Trump’s victory. How odd it is that the votes of people in the other 43 states don’t change parties very often and have little impact on the election. Both deep red and deep blue states have large minority constituencies, meaning the divide influences statewide outcomes rather than representing unanimity.
The strongest sorting in America is geographical and issue-based: rural versus urban, college-educated metros vs non-metro areas, and coastal + large cities vs interior regions.
The separation is primarily ideological, driven by the different worldviews of conservatives and liberals. These differences focus on abortion access, voting rules, gun laws, LGBTQ protections, education content, marijuana legalization, and labor protections.
A significant trend can be seen in the social sorting area, where people live among politically similar neighbors, work in ideologically aligned industries, marry within their political identity, and view the other side not just as wrong but as dangerous.
Among the social trends, marriage and family are of particular interest.
Sixty-two percent of conservatives are married, compared with 39% of liberals. This figure, often cited in commentary, is based on analyses that categorize respondents along a liberal–moderate–conservative continuum and then compare their current marital status.
Researchers say that conservatives are significantly more likely to be married than liberals, even after controlling for factors like age, income, education, and region — though those variables still influence overall rates. The gap appears to have widened for younger adults, with marriage rates declining faster among liberal young adults compared to conservative peers.
With regard to childbirth, across the U.S. (and most developed countries), religious, rural, and socially conservative adults have higher fertility, while urban, secular, college-educated liberals have fewer children and delay childbirth.
Conservative-leaning families: ~2.1–2.6 children
Liberal-leaning families: ~1.3–1.8 children
Birth rates matter more in our culture than elections because higher conservative fertility has stronger effects on church attendance, homeschooling and private education, local community norms, cultural transmission, and resistance to rapid social change. This can sustain conservative institutions and slow cultural shifts.
There are countervailing forces favoring liberals, however. Immigration is a factor because immigrants tend to be younger, have higher fertility initially, and lean Democratic overall (though not uniformly). More students in college means that college-educated voters turn out at higher rates, lean Democratic, and are growing as a share of the electorate. Urban economic gravity generates jobs, attracts young adults, and concentrates political power.
The biggest wild card: which side keeps its children? In other words, will conservatives or liberals do a better job of keeping their kids in the party?
The greatest problem of continuing polarization is that it weakens shared national narratives.
In the past, Americans disagreed politically but still agreed on what the Constitution means, what institutions are legitimate, what facts are broadly true, and what “success” looks like.
Today, each side questions the legitimacy of the other. Elections, courts, and media are now political tools. Even long-standing concepts, like freedom and equality, are being defined differently by the two sides. This battle erodes social trust, a foundation of democracy.
That also means governance becomes harder — even when one side wins, laws are reversed, the presidency becomes more powerful due to a stalemate in Congress, courts become battlegrounds, and each side wants to expand the limits of our institutions.
The U.S. divide is unlike the rest of the West because U.S. parties are farther apart ideologically than in other countries, with fewer cross-cutting identities, more winner-take-all political structures, and a media environment that reinforces separation.
In many countries, you can be left-wing and religious, right-wing and secular, and conservative but pro-welfare state. In the U.S, identities are bundled into opposing camps.
Long-Term Demographic and Cultural Consequences
Because ideology correlates with marriage, child-rearing, education choices, and geographic clustering, the divide reproduces itself over generations.
This matters because cultural values get passed on unevenly, regions diverge economically and socially, and national cohesion weakens over time. This is not just polarization — it’s civilizational drift within one country.
This trend is dangerous not because people disagree, but because each side increasingly views the other as illegitimate. Moral judgments replace policy debate, and losing feels intolerable. When political morality replaces debate, the continuing operation of democracy is put at risk.
It’s not clear that some event or factor can overcome the tribalism we are experiencing. It will take a significant event to unite the American people. Short of war, that event cannot be anticipated.
The path we have taken to tribalism is clear. The left wanted to force social and cultural change in America because they worship at the altar of equality. The right, as individualists, did not put up a fight because they weren’t interested. The objectives of the left became real when they took over academia, because that allowed them to promote one ideology after they forced out the conservatives. Left ideology became politicized and made its way into the public space, exceeding the right’s tolerance level, and tribalism emerged.
The left secretly infiltrated the elementary and primary grades with an ideology indoctrination program that wasn’t discovered until parents started asking questions. School policies were put in place to supersede parental rights.
We will have to wait and see how much of the left’s ideology march can be blocked in the future. The right must understand that the left will never give up its quest for a socialist state. They’ve been trying for 170 years to make their model work.
Wrong Speak is a free-expression platform that allows varying viewpoints. All views expressed in this article are the author’s own.





Yes, "The left secretly infiltrated the elementary and primary grades with an ideology indoctrination program that wasn’t discovered until parents started asking questions. School policies were put in place to supersede parental rights." Then the superseding went to legislation, laws and the like to reduce or eliminate parental rights.
I wrote this article over a year ago: https://thetranstrain.substack.com/p/code-of-parental-rights