A Fully Sovereign Seoul: The Debate Over South Korean Independent Nuclear Ambitions

South Korea’s foreign and national security policy is at a crossroads. North Korea’s formidable nuclear development and Biden’s lukewarm Ukraine policy and vacillating stance toward Iran (jeopardizing the passageway for 80% of East Asia’s oil) have created the impetus for South Korea’s own nuclear ambition.

Whichever direction is taken by political leaders and the will of the people, clarity of what is at stake is paramount. Hope and nostalgia are befitting romance, but not foreign policy. True imagination derives from the sturdy roots of seeing reality as it is.

If diplomacy and sanctions and big deal packages were about denuclearization, then they have failed. If deterrence is about preventing NK from obtaining nuclear capability, then it has failed. If extended deterrence is about assuring Seoul of anxieties about a nuclear first strike by Pyongyang, then it has failed.

Usually, it’s 3 strikes and you are out. Yet, the US, Korea, Japan, and the international community are adamant about continuing to feed the fictional narrative of not abandoning the denuclearization of NK or the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. It remains the official policy of nearly every nation.

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Stop. Full stop. They are all lying or in denial. The reality is this - North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons short of unconditional defeat and surrender. Addressing this reality is at the root of South Korea’s debate over nuclear weapons. 

The left is delusional about NK. This delusion is the source of its opposition to nukes. If nuclear weapons were framed as a policy that leverages the U.S. for a more balanced policy, the left would unctuously support it. 

The right is naive. It believes that the USA will defend SK, no matter what. Even some conservatives whisper behind closed doors that this is not credible.  Some Korean conservatives want an independent nuclear capability within the US-ROK architecture. Korean progressives oppose nukes because they fear NK’s reaction due to the US-ROK architecture. If so, then, the logical corollary is that the US-ROK alliance with the ROK having nuclear weapons is the crux of the problem.

The absence of credible deterrence is the progenitor of this debate. To be more specific, the credibility of the U.S. willingness to sacrifice New York over Seoul fuels the debate. Nuclear weapons are a tool, not an objective. Nuclear weapons are not a strategy or a political goal. They are a tactic. The key issue that every pundit dances around but never addresses, is sovereignty. Nuclear submarines? They are secondary, not central.

The political issue of sovereignty and operational control is the central, primary issue. The temporary solution is to divorce nukes from the U.S.-ROK alliance. The two nations should accelerate Seoul's gaining full operational control and then discuss the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

But that is a big gulf. How do we get from here to there?

The process of regaining control AND talking about nuclear capability can be agitating and yet expedited through working on a mutual target list for striking NK. If the devil is in the details, then any bona fide military operational planning for true deterrence must tackle the art of targeting. Short of this, all other policy invocations are empty gestures.

ROK’s “Kill Chain,” “Korean Air and Missile Defense” (KAMD), and “Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation” (KMPR) are empty concepts without a specific targeting list and objectives. Port visits of US SSBNs or strategic air assets or the formation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) are important symbolic gestures but fall short. 

Identifying, formulating, vetting, culling, and sharing the target list between the U.S. and ROK is the real testimony of a political alliance. Engaging in such an activity requires some trust to begin with, instills further trust, and becomes a turning point where differences can be aired. It is the nuts and bolts of alliance policy-making. 

Targeting requires both parties to identify the geographical target, ascertain the purpose of the target, determine why the target is central or peripheral, allot which weapons and platforms to deploy to strike that target, calculate the Unintended Civilian Casualty Estimate (UCCE), and conduct a timely Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) to supplement the next round of targeting.

The precedent for a real political alliance was Operation Allied Force where NATO engaged in targeting by committee. It was cumbersome and inefficient but it underscored a more important goal - fostering political unity among the allies. To be sure, this was a war campaign. We are not at war. Not yet. But we must prepare for war to avoid war. Preparing and working on a target list would advance that goal as well as provide true “assurance” for a “meaty” extended deterrence.

Absent a radical editing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the debate over South Korean independent nuclear ambitions puts the cart before the horse. The horse is a fully sovereign Seoul, with operational control of its national security policy. Only then does a debate over nuclear weapons carry true credibility. South Korea is indeed at a crossroads. The time has arrived to choose.

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